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 Title IX Compliance and Preference for Men in College Admissions 
Abstract 
 
Title IX has undoubtedly increased athletic opportunities for young high school 
and college women.  What is less well understood is whether Title IX has had the 
unintended consequence of decreasing educational opportunities for young 
women relative to men.  This paper examines the relationship between a 
university's compliance with Title IX via the proportionality standard and the 
subsequent admit rate difference by sex.  I find that a lower proportionality 
measure, indicating a lack of Title IX compliance, results in an increase in 
preference for non-athlete males in college admissions.
I. Introduction 
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance. 
 
 The above paragraph is taken from Title IX of the Education Amendments enacted in 
June, 1972.  While this regulation applies to all educational activities and programs receiving 
federal funds it has been primarily applied to and is largely credited with increasing athletic 
opportunities for women.  In 1971, only 294,000 girls participated in high school athletics, 
compared to 3.7 million boys.  In 2002, over 2.8 million girls participated on high school athletic 
teams, compared to 4.0 million boys.1  Similarly, in 1971, there were only 29,977 female athletes 
on college athletic teams compared to 170,384 male college athletes. By the 2000-2001 
academic year, the number of female college athletes had grown by over 400 percent to 150,916, 
while the number of male athletes increased by 22.6 percent, from 170,384 to 208,866 over the 
same period.2  This dramatic increase in female athletic participation at both the high school and 
college level was facilitated by the creation of additional female athletic teams.  From 1981 to 
1999 the number of women's college teams increased by 66 percent, representing approximately 
3,800 new women's sports teams, with some arguing that this growth was coming at the expense 
of athletic opportunities for male athletes.3,4    
 The full text of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 did not specify how 
institutions would be measured to be in compliance with the new law.  The Office for Civil 
                                                 
1 National Federation of State High School Associations. 2002. NFHS Participation Survey, 2002. 
2 NCAA year-by-year sports participation 1982-2001; Sports and Recreation Programs of Universities and Colleges 
1957-1982 (NCAA), as reported in "Open To All: Title IX at Thirty." The Secretary of Education's Commission on 
Opportunity in Athletics. 
3 Statement by Secretary of Education Roderick Paige before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions. June 27, 2002 at www.ed.gov/speeches/06-2002/06272002.html. 
4 National Wrestling Coaches Association versus Department of Education. 2002. 
Rights (OCR) of the Department of Education was charged with developing the details and 
metrics of compliance and with enforcing Title IX.  After years of review and feedback from 
constituents the OCR issued policy interpretations in December of 1979 specifying how 
institutions were to be assessed to be in compliance with Title IX.  The policy interpretations laid 
out a "three-prong" test of compliance.  An institution need illustrate meeting only one of the 
following three tests: 
(a.) provide participation opportunities substantially proportionate to the ratio of males to 
females in the student body (the proportionality standard); 
(b.) show a history and continuing practice of upgrading girls' and women's programs; 
(c.) meet the interests and abilities of  women on campus 
Although the 1979 policy interpretations consciously provided for a flexible three part means of 
complying with Title IX many institutions have indicated that their attorneys have advised them 
that the only safe way to be in compliance with Title IX is via the proportionality standard.5  In 
fact, many federal courts have focused on the proportionality standard in Title IX litigation.6  As 
a result the OCR has deemed the proportionality standard a safe-harbor in demonstrating 
compliance with Title IX.  This means that if an institution can show substantial proportionality 
than the OCR will deem it in compliance with Title IX.  Because the other two prongs are more 
ambiguous an institution may view its compliance based on these tests as placing it in a more 
vulnerable position in regards to Title IX litigation; thus, regardless of how an institution 
demonstrates compliance with Title IX it may feel substantial pressure to improve its 
proportionality measure.  This measure is the percentage of the athletes that are female minus the 
percentage of the student body that are female.  A negative proportionality measure indicates that 
                                                 
5 The Secretary of Education's Commission on Opportunity in Athletics. 2003. "Open Access To All." Pg 23. 
6  Cohen v. Brown University; Horner v. Kentucky High School Athletic Association; Kelley v. Board of Trustees; 
Neal v. Board of Trustees of the California State Universities; and, Roberts v. Colorado State Board of Agriculture. 
 2  
the institution has a smaller percentage of female athletes than female students.  For example, an 
institution where women represent 45 percent of the athletes and 55 percent of the student body 
would have a proportionality measure of minus 10.  While no specific number has been 
identified as indicating compliance, substantially proportionate has usually been defined as a 
proportionality measure of at least minus 5 (Anderson and Cheslock (2004), Stafford (2004), and 
Sigelman and Wahlbeck (1999)).  While some institutions have an over representation of female 
athletes no institution has been found to discriminate against men, so non-compliance is defined 
as a low proportionality measure and not a high proportionality measure in this analysis. 
 Title IX and the subsequent regulations and policy interpretations are all clearly designed 
to increase the educational and athletic opportunities of women.  The evidence outlined above 
and discussed in the following literature review reveal that has indeed been the result.  Viewed as 
whether athletic opportunities have increased for women over the past 30 years, Title IX can 
only be viewed as a resounding success.  Clearly, many more girls and women participate in 
athletics than was the case prior to 1972.  Whether Title IX has restricted athletic opportunities 
for boys and men is less clear.  What has not been examined in the vast discussion and analysis 
of Title IX is whether Title IX has had an impact on the college admissions of men and women 
outside of athletics. 
 In 1972, 44 percent of all bachelor's degrees were awarded to women.  In 2000, 57 
percent of all bachelor's degrees were awarded to women.  This is the result of a growing trend 
of female enrollment in college that pre-dates the implementation of Title IX.  Because the 
proportionality standard requires that the proportion of athletes that are female substantially 
matches the proportion of students that are female colleges may be faced with the problem of 
either continually increasing the number of female athletes and/or decreasing the number of male 
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athletes so that more than half of all athletes are women.  Alternatively, institutions may feel 
pressure to comply with the proportionality standard by limiting enrollment of female students 
relative to men.  An institution that enrolled the national proportion of women (57 percent) and 
had 50-50 female to male athletes would have a proportionality standard of minus 7, and may not 
be viewed by the OCR as complying with the proportionality standard.  While a number of 
studies (discussed below) have examined the impact of Title IX on athletic opportunities for 
male and female athletes, none have examined whether Title IX has had the unintended 
consequence of limiting enrollment for female non-athlete students and encouraging the 
enrollment of more male non-athlete students.  This effect may be increasingly prescient if the 
percentage of the college student body that is female continues to increase. 
 There is some anecdotal evidence that institutions are beginning to feel pressure to enroll 
more men and that this pressure is exacerbated by the Title IX proportionality standard.  At a 
1999 conference entitled "Fewer Men on Campus," a number of college presidents expressed 
concern that enrolling an increasing proportion of women would result in non-compliance in 
"federal gender-equity requirements in athletics."7  Some institutions have reportedly begun to 
respond to the relative imbalance in applications by offering preference to men in college 
admissions.  The University of Georgia, for example, eliminated in 1999 its admissions policy of 
providing men with preference in admissions, but only after it was sued by a woman who argued 
that she was denied admission based in part on her sex.8
 While opportunities for male and female athletes is an important issue, the possible 
implications of Title IX on educational opportunities for male and female college students has 
the potential of influencing many more students in a much more important manner.  Access to 
                                                 
7 "Colleges Look for Ways to Reverse a Decline in Enrollment of Men." Chronicle of Higher Education. November 
26, 1999.  p. A73. chronicle.com/colloquy/99/gradrate/background.html. 
8 Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.  
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high quality educational programs is more important from a policy standard point than whether 
one gets to play intercollegiate soccer.  This paper will examine whether Title IX and the 
proportionality standard in an environment of increasing enrollment of women relative to men 
has had the unintended consequence of leading to preference for men in college admissions.  
 The paper will continue in Section II by outlining the existing literature on Title IX and 
its effects on higher education, followed by a theoretical model of college prestige maximization 
in Section III, a discussion of the data in Section IV, the empirical methodology in Section V, the 
regression results in Section VI, and finally the policy implications and conclusions in Section 
VII. 
II. Literature Review 
 There are a number of papers and articles that discuss the growing trend of female 
enrollment in higher education relative to men.9  Mortenson's (1999) study provides a broad 
historical overview of the long-term growth in the percentage of postsecondary students who are 
female.  His analysis shows that the trend of increasing female participation in tertiary education 
goes back to at least 1870, when women accounted for approximately 15 percent of bachelor's 
degrees awarded in the United States.  By 1920 this percentage had increased to about 34 
percent, and by 1940 it was 41 percent.  With the exception of a post-World War II spike in 
enrollment among men, the percentage of bachelor's degrees awarded to women has followed a 
steadily increasing path so that today women receive approximately 57 percent of all bachelor's 
degrees.10  This long term trend suggests that the more recent Title IX legislation played little or 
no role in the trend toward more female enrollment in college. 
                                                 
9 There is a vast literature on many aspects of Title IX that go beyond the scope of this study.  A thorough historical 
and legal overview of Title IX can be found in Carpenter and Acosta (2005), and a current state of the Title IX 
landscape and issues is outlined in The Secretary of Education's Commission on Opportunity in Athletics. (2003). 
10 National Coalition for Women and Girls in Education. 2002. Title IX at Thirty: Report Card on Gender Equity. 
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 Similarly, Jacob (2002) using data from a nationally representative cohort of eighth 
graders in 1988 found that approximately 68 percent of the men and 73 percent of the women in 
his sample attended college.  He concludes that 90 percent of this differential in enrollment rates 
can be attributed to differences between the sexes in non-cognitive skills and college premia.  
 In an investigation into preference for men in college admission Mark Clayton (2001) of 
the Christian Science Monitor examined data on 1,006 coed, four-year colleges and universities 
and found that 259 of them admitted men at higher rates than women for at least one of the three 
years examined (fall 1997-1999).  He does not say by how much, nor does he say how many 
institutions had higher admit rates for women, nor does he say what the overall average admit 
rates for men and women were.  Among 124 selective institutions with admit rates less than 50 
percent only 15 institutions admitted men at higher rates than women all three years.  Again he 
does not say on average by how much, nor how many institutions, if any, had higher admit rates 
for women.  Nevertheless, he interviewed a number of admissions personnel who claim that men 
receive preference in college admissions at many institutions.  According to Clark a spokesmen 
at the OCR reported that their office receives an average of 20 complaints a year about gender 
bias in college admissions.  He did not report how many were from women or were 
undergraduate cases.  Gose (1999) reported similar anecdotes from a meeting of college 
presidents and education experts at Goucher College in 1999.  Both these articles cite numerous 
interviews with college administrators about preference for men in admissions, but neither 
provides concrete evidence indicating that this is indeed the case broadly. 
 Baum and Goodstein (2005) examine whether men in fact receive preference in college 
admissions at liberal arts colleges where the dearth of men in the most acute.  They use detailed 
admissions information from 13 selective liberal arts colleges to investigate whether men are 
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given preferential treatment in college admissions.  They conclude that men generally did not 
receive preference in admissions at this set of schools.   
 Other studies have focused more on the effects of Title IX and how institutions comply 
with the policy regulations and the impact it has had on athletic opportunities for men and 
women.  For example, Anderson and Cheslock (2004) find that institutions were more likely to 
add female teams and female athletes than to cut male teams and reduce the number of male 
athletes in response to non-compliance with the proportionality measure.  In a similar study, 
Cheslock and Anderson (2005) outline the general improvement in most institutions' 
proportionality measures from 1995 to 2001.  They find that increases in women's athletic 
opportunities accounted for the overwhelming majority of the improvement in most institutions' 
proportionality measures.  They note that male athletes and the female share of the 
undergraduate population both increased over this period causing the proportionality measures to 
improve less than they otherwise would have. 
 A series of related studies focuses on institutional characteristics that are correlated with 
compliance with the Title IX proportionality standard.  Rishe (1999) reports that most 
institutions with large football programs are not in compliance with the proportionality standard.  
This result is echoed throughout a number of subsequent studies.  Sigelman and Wahlbeck 
(1999) also find that football programs make it more likely that an institution will not meet the 
proportionality standard.  They find that schools are more likely to be in compliance with the 
proportionality standard if they have few female students relative to men, more financial 
resources devoted to female athletes, smaller athletic programs, and do not field a football team.   
 Using a probit analysis of compliance with Title IX, defined as having a proportionality 
measure greater than minus 5, Stafford (2004) finds that institutions with fewer women 
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undergraduates relative to men are more likely to be in compliance.  She also finds that larger 
institutions in terms of undergraduate enrollment are more likely to be compliant, while southern 
institutions are less likely to be compliant. 
 Anderson, Cheslock, and Ehrenberg (2004) find that while most institutions improved in 
terms of their proportionality measure from 1995/96 to 2001/02 most institutions are still not in 
compliance with the proportionality standard.  Their results suggest that less selective, less 
wealthy, smaller institutions with a larger percentage of female students are less likely to be in 
compliance with the proportionality standard.  They also find that institutions in the Midwest and 
South (relative to the West) and with a football team are less likely to be in compliance with the 
proportionality standard. 
 The primary consensus of the above studies is that smaller institutions, with a high 
percentage of female students, a large number of athletes, the presence of a football team, and 
located in the South are all associated with being less likely to be in compliance with the 
proportionality standard of Title IX.  The above brief review of the literature illustrates that a 
number of studies have begun to examine differences in admissions treatment between the sexes, 
and an even larger number of studies have examined the influence of Title IX on athletic 
opportunities for both men and women.  This paper will link the two areas of investigation and 
analyze whether Title IX has played a role in the admissions treatment of men and women in the 
overall student body. 
III. Theoretical Model 
 The university is modeled as a prestige or reputation maximizing agent.  A university will 
devote resources to and attempt to attract inputs in an attempt to maximize the prestige of the 
institution.  While university prestige is a function of a number of inputs including faculty 
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quality, administrative efficiency, and student characteristics, it is only the latter in this setting 
that will be examined.   In this simplified framework a university's prestige is assumed to be a 
function of student academic quality and student athletic quality.  That is a student can increase 
the prestige of an institution by either enhancing the academic profile of the university or by 
raising the athletic standing of the university.  In the context of Title IX and preference for men 
in admissions I allow male and female students and athletes to enter into the prestige production 
function separately.  Of course all universities, no matter how wealthy, face a budget constraint, 
so the university's objective is to obtain inputs in an attempt to maximize prestige subject to its 
budget constraint.  This constrained prestige maximization as a function of student inputs 
problem can be written as: 
(1)  
mAfAmSfS
mfmf
A*PA*PS*PS*P  B
subject to
)A,A,S,f(S  P max
mfmf +++=
=
where Sf are female students, Sm are male students, Af are female athletes, and Am are male 
athletes.  For simplicity each individual is assumed to contribute to the prestige of the institution 
as either an athlete or a student.  The total university budget for students is assumed fixed in the 
short term at B, and the price of each input is represented by P and the appropriate subscript.  As 
virtually all students receive a subsidy from their universities of some magnitude (Lewis and 
Winston (1997)) a student's or an athlete's price is the difference between the costs to the 
university, of that student, and the revenue that they receive from that student.  It is further 
assumed that all student inputs increase the prestige of the university, but at a declining rate.  In 
the absence of a corner solution, that is if prestige maximization occurs where at least some male 
and female students and athletes are enrolled, then the solution to the above constrained 
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objective function has the familiar result of enrolling student inputs up to the point where the 
marginal prestige of each input divided by its price are equal across all inputs.  That is: 
(2) 
mfmf A
m
A
f
S
m
S
f
P
)MP(A
P
)MP(A
P
)MP(S
P
)MP(S ===  
where MP indicates the marginal prestige of that input.  If the price of male and female students 
is the same, PSf=PSm, then an institution will enroll male and female students up to the point 
where their marginal prestige is the same.  Assuming that male and female students of 
comparable quality increase the prestige of an institution at the same rate, then conditional on 
their academic credentials, and assuming that their prices are the same, universities should be 
just as likely to admit female applicants as male applicants.  In the event where the price of male 
and female students are different or the marginal prestige of comparable male and female 
students are different than universities may be more likely to admit one group over the other. 
 Similarly, universities should enroll male and female athletes such that the marginal 
prestige of each group of athletes divided by its price are equal (and equal to the marginal 
prestige divided by the price of male and female student inputs).  In the case where the price of 
male and female athletes are not equal, PAf ≠ PAm , either because the costs to the university for 
enrolling male and female athletes may be different or because the revenue from male and 
female athletes may be different, or both, or because the marginal prestige of each group of 
athletes may be different due to student, alumni, or customer discrimination, then a university 
will maximize prestige by enrolling different levels of male and female athletes. 
 The Title IX legislation adds an additional constraint to the university prestige 
maximization objective.  Institutions now feel pressure to comply with the proportionality 
standard of enrolling female athletes in proportion to their representation in the overall student 
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body, Af/Am = Sf/Sm.  The institution's Lagrangian function now contains both a budget 
constraint and a proportionality constraint: 
(3) 
)SA-S(A            
)A*P-A*P-S*P-S*P-(B)A,A,S,f(SL
f*mm*f
mAfAmSfSmfmf mfmf
μ
λ+=
 
Taking the first partial derivatives with respect to Sf and Sm and solving for λ results in: 
(4) )
P
P*SS(- 
P
P*)MP(S  )MP(S
f
m
f
m
S
S
mf
S
S
fm += μ  
As long as either Sf or Sm are not equal to zero, that is as long as some athletes are enrolled, then 
the impact of the proportionality constraint on the marginal prestige of male students depends on 
the sign of μ.       
 Taking the first partial derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to Af and Am and 
solving for μ results in: 
(5) )
P
)MP(A
P
)MP(A(*)
P*SP*S
P*P( μ 
fmmf
fm
A
f
A
m
smSf
SS −+=  
The first term in parentheses must be positive, so the sign of μ depends upon the sign of the 
second term in the parentheses.  If the marginal prestige of male athletes divided by its price is 
equal to the marginal prestige of female athletes divided by its price, then the proportionality 
constraint is non-binding, μ=0, and equation (4) reverts to the solution in the absence of the 
proportionality constraint.  On the other hand, if Title IX prompts institutions to either enroll 
more female athletes or to enroll fewer male athletes than they otherwise would in order to 
comply with the standard, then the marginal prestige of female athletes divided by its price will 
be less than the marginal prestige of male athletes divided by its price and μ will be positive.  
The evidence of substantially more female athletic opportunities on college campuses following 
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Title IX in 1972 suggests that in fact Title IX has prompted institutions to provide more athletic 
opportunities for females than they otherwise would have.   
 If μ is positive, as seems likely, then the marginal prestige of male students divided by its 
price will be less than the marginal prestige of female students divided by its price in equation 
(4).  This implies that more male students and fewer female students will be enrolled than would 
be the case in the absence of the Title IX proportionality standard. 
 The intuition behind this result lies in the construction of the proportionality standard, 
which states not that the number of female athletes has to equal the number of male athletes, but 
rather that the proportion of female athletes has to equal the proportion of female students.  In 
order to comply with this standard, institutions can increase the number of female athletes, as 
evidence overwhelming suggests is often the case, reduce the number of male athletes, as some 
evidence suggests is the case (and some does not), or reduce the number of female students 
relative to the number of male students.  This latter approach to complying with the 
proportionality standard has become increasingly prescient as the numbers and percentage of 
female undergraduates has grown to the point where female undergraduates now out number 
male undergraduates.  At some institutions with a large percentage of female applicants, 
complying with the Title IX proportionality standard requires either having more female athletes 
than male athletes or limiting the number of female undergraduates, or both.  This suggests that 
those universities struggling to comply with the proportionality standard, ceteris paribus, would 
be more likely to provide preference for male students in admissions. 
IV. Empirical Methodology    
 The above theoretical model predicts that institutions confronted with non-compliance 
with the proportionality standard should be more likely to provide preference for males in the 
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general admissions process.  Of course, institutions may be interested in preserving a balance 
between the sexes in the student body even in the absence of Title IX.  If university 
administrators perceive that most students would prefer to attend an institution with 
approximately equal numbers of men and women (with the exception of those individuals who 
prefer to attend a single-sex institution), they may attempt to enroll a class not just based on 
academic merit, but also based on sex.  As a result the admit rate of a particular group may 
depend not just on its qualifications but also on its numbers relative to the other group.  As a 
result the admit rate of sex j (j=female, male) at institution i, in year t will be: 
 
(6)  admit ratej,i,t = α + αi + αj,i + B1(no. applicantsj,i,t) + B2(average SATj,i,t) + νt + εj,i,t 
 
where αi are institution specific effects, αj,i are institution-sex-specific effects, νt are year 
specific effects, and εj,i,t are random error effects.  The degree of preference for one sex over the 
other in admissions, if any, can be assessed by taking the difference in equation (6) across sexes 
within institutions in a given year, such that: 
(7)  (admit rate m,i,t - admit rate f,i,t) = (αm,i-αf,i) + B1(no. applicants m,i,t - no. applicants f,i,t) 
 +B2(ave. SAT m,i,t - ave. SAT f,i,t) + (ε m,i,t - ε f,i,t) 
Institution fixed effects and year effects cancel out in this equation.  It is expected that B1 is 
negative.  The more applicants from one group relative to the other the lower the expected admit 
rate of that group relative to the other.  B2 is expected to be positive.  The more qualified one 
group is relative to the other the greater the admit rate of that group.  The constant term in this 
equation reflects a set of institution specific preference for men in admissions effects.  Equation 
(7) is an institution fixed effects regression, where the fixed effects terms capture institution 
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specific preference for men.  These terms are "fixed" only in the sense of being average effects 
over the time period estimated, and may adjust over longer periods of time. 
 The hypothesis to be tested here is whether these institution specific effects, conditional 
on the relative gender mix of the applicant pool and the male versus female quality of the 
institution's applicant pool, are related to an institution's Title IX compliance.  Of course, 
institutions that do provide preference for males (or females) in admissions are more (less) likely 
to be in compliance with the proportionality standard.  In other words, an institution's 
proportionality measure is endogenously determined by its preference for one sex over the other.  
An institution that provides preference for male students, for whatever reason, in admissions is 
more likely to be in compliance with the proportionality measure, holding the mix of athletes 
constant, while an institution providing preference for female students in admissions is less likely 
to be in compliance.  Two steps are taken to account for the endogeneity of the proportionality 
measure and the estimated institutional difference in admit rates by sex.  First, the estimated 
institution specific fixed effects from equation (7) are saved and regressed against the 
institutions' lagged proportionality measures as outlined in Greene (2002) and Lazear (2000).  
This treats an institution's average admissions decisions from time period t to t+4 as a function of 
its proportionality measure at t-1.  This accomplishes two things.  One, because each institution's 
preference for one sex over the other is averaged over multiple years noisy fluctuations in admit 
rates between the sexes is averaged out over time.  Two, the average difference in admit rates 
between the sexes is regressed against a lagged value of the proportionality measure limiting 
possible endogeneity; however, because an institution's proportionality measure is a function of 
previous admissions decisions this may only partially solve the endogeneity problem if 
admissions decisions and policies are correlated over time.  The second step in attempting to 
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account for endogeneity is to utilize two stage least squares.  The first stage regresses an 
institution's lagged proportionality measure against the exogenous variables in the equation 
including institutional characteristics that are thought to be correlated with the proportionality 
measure but not otherwise the overall preference for men versus women in admissions, such as 
the number of men's and women's sports teams, a dummy variable for having a football team, 
and total athletic department revenue.  The fitted value from this first stage regression is then 
used in estimating the relationship between preference for men in admissions and compliance 
with the proportionality measure.    
V. Data 
 The bulk of the data for this analysis comes from the College Board's Annual Survey of 
Colleges for the academic years 1999/2000 to 2002/2003.  The College Board conducts an 
annual survey of U.S. colleges, universities, vocational and technical institutions, and graduate 
schools.  The survey asks a series of questions about admissions and operating policies at the 
institutions.  Included among the questions is the number of applicants and admitted students by 
gender to each institution.  From this information I am able to calculate institution level admit 
rates by sex for each of the survey years.  Additionally, the survey provides information on the 
number of men's and women's athletic teams, the total number of undergraduates, the Carnegie 
classification of the institution, and whether the institution is private or publicly controlled. 
 This institutional data is merged with additional information provided from the College 
Board on average SAT I scores by sex requested by test takers to be sent to each institution.  
Admit rates by sex and other institutional attributes from the Annual Survey of Colleges are 
matched with average scores by sex that test takers requested to be sent to the institution in the 
previous year.  Additionally, this data was merged with institution level proportionality measures 
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taken from the online Chronicle of Higher Education.  The online Chronicle provided 
information on the proportionality measure, NCAA division, and total athletic department 
revenue taken from each institutions Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act report.  
 There were a number of restrictions made on the data before forming the final sample of 
institutions (see Table 1).  There were originally 1,325 four year, coed, non-technical institutions 
in the data set providing 3,977 institution-year observations, over the 1999/2000 to 2002/2003 
academic years.  Because I am only interested in preference in admissions by sex I limit the 
sample to those institutions that are at least modestly selective in admissions and admit 67 
percent of their applicants or less.  This results in 423 institutions and 1,068 observations.  
Additionally, 32 institutions and 61 observations were eliminated either because average sent 
SAT scores were not available or fewer than 30 individuals per sex requested that their scores be 
sent to the institution.  This restriction was made in order to assure that the average sent SAT 
scores adequately capture the differences in academic credentials between the male and female 
applicant pools within an institution.  Because both the theoretical model and the estimation 
strategy rely on identifying the admissions preference for male versus female non-athletes, and 
not the preference given to male versus female athletes, I limit the sample to institutions large 
enough that their overall difference in admit rates for men versus women overwhelmingly 
reflects preferences between non-athletes by sex.  For example, at a number of small, selective 
institutions like the Ivy League or the Pentagonal Group athletes represent between one quarter 
and one third of the overall student body (Shuman and Bowen (2001)).  Clearly, at these types of 
institutions preferences for male versus female athletes taints the overall admit rates for male 
versus female students.   In order to reduce this effect I limit the sample to institutions where 
athletes likely represent a small fraction of the overall student body.  Initially this restriction is 
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made by eliminating institutions with fewer than 10,000 full-time equivalent undergraduates 
(alternative restrictions are examined and discussed below).  This also has the effect of limiting 
the sample to those institutions that are large enough to garner the most attention in regards to 
Title IX compliance and to face the most vulnerability in terms of potential litigation as 
discussed in the existing literature.  This restriction results in a sample of 80 institutions and 220 
institution-year observations.  Finally, there were 4 institutions which did not report a 
proportionality measure prior to the sample period and thus were removed from the sample 
leaving 76 institutions and 212 observations. 
 Table 2 provides summary measures for selected variables from this sample of 
institutions.  Perhaps most interesting is the result that among this set of large selective 
institutions the average admit rate for men is 50 percent, while the average admit rate across 
institutions for women is 52.7 percent.11  Also, on average 9,410 men and 11,081 women applied 
to each of these institutions; thus the average institution received 54 percent of its applications 
from women.  It is also interesting to note that the average sent SAT-math score for men across 
institutions was 564.4 versus 529.5 for women (plus 34.9), and the average sent SAT-verbal 
score for men was 526.6 versus 520.6 for women (plus 6).  These scores compare to an overall 
difference in results across gender for the 2000 SAT of plus 35 for men on math, and plus 3 for 
men on the verbal sections of the SAT I test.  This suggest that neither sex over or under applies 
in terms of institutional quality based on SAT scores.  
 The bottom section of Table 2 provides summary measures of the athletic profile of each 
institution.  Only initial survey year or lagged year values are provided as this is the only 
information used in the following regressions.  The average lagged proportionality measure was 
minus 7.4 indicating that the difference in the percentage of the athletes that were female from 
                                                 
11 All summary measures are weighted using the total number of applicants to the institution that year.  
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the percentage of the student body that was female was over 7 percentage points.  This under-
representation of women among the athletes seems to persist despite approximately equal 
numbers of male and female athletic teams, 10.2 versus 9.9, respectively.  This gap in female 
athletes may be because approximately 72 percent of the institutions had football teams that 
usually require many more athletes than most other teams.  
VI. Regression Results 
 The estimation strategy relies on first estimating the institution-level difference in admit 
rates for men versus women conditional on academic qualifications and the gender mix of the 
applicant pool as specified in equation (7) above.  Table 3 presents the results of the regression 
of the difference in male versus female admit rates on differences in average sent math SAT 
scores, average sent verbal SAT scores, and the number of male versus female applicants.  A 
Lagrange multiplier test suggests the presence of error components consistent with institution-
specific differences in admit rates across genders.  A Hausman test suggests the use of random 
effects over fixed effects in estimating the regression coefficients and their standard errors.  
Specification (1) of Table 3 presents GLS estimates of the regression of the difference in admit 
rates across gender on the difference in SAT scores and the number of applicants by gender.  
 It appears that differences in academic qualifications, at least as measured by differences 
in average SAT scores, do not play a statistically significant role in determining differences in 
admit rates of one sex over the other.  While the coefficients of both the math and verbal SAT 
scores are the expected positive sign, neither coefficient is significant at conventional levels.  
Quadratic terms in both average SAT scores were also found not to be significant.  On the other 
hand, differences in the applicant pool sizes by sex are significant.  The more applicants there are 
from a particular sex the lower the admit rate of that sex, conditional on average SAT scores.  
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This negative relationship between the applicant pool size and the sex specific admit rate 
becomes even more negative as the difference in applications between sexes becomes larger (a 
cubic term in application differences was not significant).  Because women outnumber men in 
most institutional applicant pools and in overall applications this effect tends to increase the 
admit rate for men and decrease the admit rate for women.  The average institution in this sample 
had approximately 1,672 more female applicants than male applicants, resulting in 
approximately one percent higher predicted admit rate for men than women, ceteris paribus.   
 The objective of this analysis is to estimate the institution specific differences in admit 
rates by sex.  Estimating these fixed effects with a complete set of dummy variables allows one 
to identify each institution's average difference in admit rates by sex conditional on SAT scores 
and the applicant mix.  The weighted (by total number of applicants) average institutional fixed 
effect is -2.4 percent, indicating that men have admit rates that are approximately two and a half 
percentage points lower than would be expected based on differences in average sent SAT scores 
and the mix of applicants across gender.    The constant term in an OLS regression provides an 
additional estimate of the average difference in admit rates across genders and is estimated to be 
-2.3 percent.  Similarly, the constant in the GLS regression estimates an average difference in 
admit rates of -3.8 percent.  All three estimates indicate that men are admitted at lower rates on 
average than would be expected based on their SAT scores and number of applicants.  The same 
qualitative results were found in specification (2) of Table 3 when excluding the difference in the 
number of applications among the regressors and just estimating admit rates based on average 
sent SAT scores.  This approach mimics a gender-blind admissions policy and eliminates any 
preference that men might be receiving due to their smaller applicant base.  Still men were less 
likely to be admitted than women. 
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 This result appears contradictory to the conventional wisdom that men are sometimes 
provided preference in college admissions (see Mortensen (1999), Clayton (2001)) and is worth 
examining in more detail.  To test the robustness of this result I limited the sample of institutions 
to those with more than 8,000 full-time equivalent undergraduates (98 institutions, and 275 
observations) and then again with more than 12,000 (62 institutions, and 180 observations) 
undergraduates and found similar results (see specifications (3) and (4) of Table 3).  In both 
cases men are less likely to be admitted than women conditional on average sent SAT scores and 
number of applications, but even more so at the smaller institutions.  It appears that at the 
sufficiently large, selective institutions that make up this sample that men are less likely to be 
admitted than women, both unconditionally when comparing raw admit rates by sex and 
conditional on average standardized test scores and applicant pool sizes by sex.  Similar results 
were found when using the natural log of the ratio of admit rates by sex (Appendix A, Table 1A).  
Men were once again less likely to be admitted than women conditional on average SAT scores 
and applicant pool size.  This result appears robust to sample construction and functional form of 
the regression equation. 
 Of the 76 institutions included in the primary sample, 55 had higher unconditional 
average admit rates for women than men, and 21 institutions had higher unconditional average 
admit rates for men.  Additionally, 22 institutions had unconditional average admit rates for 
women that were 5 percentage points higher or more than the male admit rate, while only 5 
institutions had unconditional admit rates that were 5 percentage points or more higher for men 
than women.  Controlling for differences in average sent SAT scores and the mix of applicants 
by sex results in institution fixed effects that revealed higher conditional admit rates for women 
at 56 institutions (and higher average admit rates for men at 20), and 22 institutions with fixed 
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effects of 5 percentage points or more in favor of women and only 3 with 5 percentage points or 
more in favor of men.  The conventional wisdom that men are receiving preference in the general 
admissions pool at least at large selective institutions does not seem to be the case.  In fact, just 
the opposite appears to be true.  Despite representing only 46 percent of the average applicant 
pool and having higher average math and verbal SAT scores men have lower acceptance rates at 
most institutions in this sample of selective institutions.   
 It may be the case that average sent SAT scores do not adequately reflect the academic 
qualifications of the applicant pool, and that men and women differ systematically in other 
measures of academic preparedness, such as high school grade point average and extra-curricular 
activities.  In fact, there is evidence to support the claim that women over-perform and men 
under-perform in terms of college grade point average conditional on SAT scores (Rothstein 
(2004), Burton and Ramist (2001), and Leonard and Jiang (1999)).  If this is the case, then men's 
lower average admit rates, conditional on average sent SAT scores, reflect differences in the true 
underlying academic credentials of the applicant pools by sex and should not by themselves be 
interpreted as accurate measures of preferences in admissions based on sex.  As long as the 
difference in these other measures of academic preparedness, conditional on average SAT scores, 
are not correlated with an institution's proportionality measure one is able to estimate the 
influence of non-compliance with the proportionality standard on the difference in admit rates by 
sex.12  The average admit rate difference between the sexes for institutions in compliance with 
the proportionality standard (proportionality measure greater than minus 5) is -.0402, while the 
average admit rate difference for institutions with proportionality measures less than minus 5 is   
-.0139, or 2.63 percentage points higher.  This result is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
                                                 
12 The intercept in this equation will no longer be unbiased, but the slope coefficient estimates will be (see Greene 
(2000) pg. 219). 
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level, suggesting that institutions that are not compliant with the proportionality standard display 
higher average admit rates for men relative to women in subsequent years than institutions that 
are compliant with the proportionality standard. 
 Column (1) of Table 4 present OLS estimates of the difference in estimated admit rates 
regressed on a quadratic in the lagged proportionality measure, the overall admit rate of the 
institution, the number of full-time equivalent undergraduates, and a dummy variable for public 
control.  The coefficients on the proportionality measure and its square are significant at least at 
the 10 percent level.  The lower the proportionality measure the more likely are men to be 
admitted relative to women.  Evaluated at the mean proportionality measure (-7.4) men are 
approximately 3 percentage points more likely to be admitted than women relative to an 
institution in complete compliance with the proportionality standard (proportionality measure 
equals zero).  Additionally, men are less likely to be admitted to public institutions than private 
institutions.  The size and selectivity of an institution do not have a significant impact on the 
relative admit rates by sex. 
   Because of the possible endogeneity of the proportionality measure in determining the 
difference in admit rates by sex two-stage least squares estimation is utilized.  In the first stage 
the proportionality measure is regressed on dummy variables for public control, masters 
university (versus research or doctoral), NCAA division, and the continuous variables of the 
overall admit rate as a measure of institutional quality, the number of male applicants, the 
number of female applicants, the number of full time equivalent undergraduates, the number of 
men's teams, the number of women's teams, and a quadratic in total athletic department revenue.  
This first stage regression in Table 4 reveals a number of interesting results.  The only 
statistically significant effects are the size of the institution as measured by the number of 
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undergraduates, public control, and the number of male and female applicants.  While 
institutions clearly have control over their Title IX compliance the primary factors in 
determining an institution's proportionality measure are things that are largely outside of their 
control.  Consistent with earlier studies the more undergraduates an institution has the more 
likely it is to comply with the proportionality standard (a negative proportionality standard 
indicates that women are a smaller percentage of the athletes than they are of the student body).   
Public institutions have on average a proportionality measure that is 4.9 points lower than 
comparable private institutions.  This suggests that public institutions are less likely to be 
complying with the proportionality standard than private institutions.  The number of male 
applicants increases an institution's likelihood of compliance with the proportionality standard 
while the number of female applicants decreases an institution's likelihood of compliance with 
this measure.  The more male applicants an institution has to choose from the more likely it will 
be able to enroll a sufficient number of men to keep the percentage of male athletes 
approximately equal to the percentage of men in the overall student body.  Institutions with a 
large number of female applicants are less likely to be able to have enough athletic opportunities 
for women to match their representation in the student body.  An institution's mix of applicants 
plays a significant role in its ability to meet the proportionality standard. 
 As expected the more male athletic teams an institution has the less likely it is to be 
compliant with the proportionality standard, while the more female athletic teams an institution 
has the more likely it is to meet the proportionality standard, although neither of these results are 
statistically significant.  Similarly, the existence of a football team lowers an institution's 
proportionality measure by 2.5 percentage points, although this effect is also not significant.  
None of the other regressors were found to be statistically significant, but were included in order 
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to help increase the accuracy of the fitted value for the proportionality measure.  The R-squared 
in this regression is approximately .44. 
  The second-stage regresses the estimated conditional difference in admit rates across 
sexes against the fitted proportionality measure from the first-stage, the overall admit rate, the 
number of undergraduates, and the dichotomous public control variable.  The dependent variable 
measures the average of the admit rate for men minus the admit rate for women conditional on 
the difference in average sent SAT scores and number of applicants.  An increase in the 
dependent variable indicates preference for men relative to women.  At publicly controlled 
institutions the difference in admit rates for men versus women is 5 percentage points lower than 
at private institutions.  Men are less likely to be admitted, relative to women, at public 
institutions than at private institutions.  This result is significant at the one percent level.  On the 
other hand, the selectivity of the institution as measured by the overall admit rate and the size of 
the institution as measured by the number of full time equivalent undergraduates are not 
statistically significant in explaining variation in institutional differences in admit rates by sex. 
 The result of primary interest here is the effect of the proportionality measure on the 
relative admit rates of men versus women.  As expected, institutions with lower lagged 
proportionality measures, indicating less compliance with Title IX, are subsequently more likely 
to provide preference for men in college admissions.  A quadratic term in the proportionality 
measure was found to be significant indicating that the effect increases as the level of non-
compliance increases.  An institution with the average proportionality measure is approximately 
9 percentage points (-.017*(-7.4) -.0006*(7.4^2)) more likely to admit men relative to women 
than an institution in complete compliance with the proportionality standard (proportionality 
measure equals zero).  This result is significant at the one percent level.  Because complete 
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compliance overstates the proportionality measure that is usually deemed to be in compliance 
with the proportionality standard, and because only a rare few institutions have a proportionality 
measure that is quite close to zero, the above calculation probably overstates the level of 
preference for men that results from the average non-compliance.  A better measure compares 
the relative admit rate difference for the average institution with an institution within the -3 to -5 
proportionality range that is usually deemed compliant with Title IX.  An institution with a 
proportionality measure of -7.4 is estimated to have an admit rate for men that is approximately 
3.5 percentage points higher than the admit rate for women, relative to an institution that is has a 
proportionality measure of -4.   
 The proportionality measure was interacted with each of the other independent variables 
and was only found to be significant when interacted with the number of undergraduates (and in 
this case the quadratic term was no longer significant).  The effect of the proportionality measure 
on the relative difference in admit rates between the sexes is more pronounced at institutions 
with more undergraduates.  The effect is negative at institutions of more than approximately 
10,000 students (almost the entire sample in this case).  This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that those institutions with the most visible athletic programs based of the size of the institution 
are most sensitive to the importance of complying with the proportionality standard of Title IX. 
 As an alternative examination of the importance of institutional size in this relationship I 
performed two-stage least squares estimation on the sample of institutions including those with 
only eight thousand students or more and then again on the sample with twelve thousand 
students or more (see Table 5).  While the coefficients on the proportionality measure (and its 
quadratic) were still negative in the sample with the smaller institutions, the coefficients were 
both smaller in magnitude and no longer statistically significant.  The smaller the institutions 
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included in the sample the more "contaminated" is the dependent variable with preferences for 
male versus female athletes rather than just male versus female students, and so additional 
caution is warranted in interpreting these results.  On the other hand, the effect of the 
proportionality measure on the difference in admit rates between sexes is even larger in the 
sample of institutions with more than twelve thousand students.  Moving from the average 
proportionality measure (-7.4) to compliance  (-4) increases the predicted admit rate for men 
relative to women by approximately 4.5 percentage points at larger institutions.  Taken together 
these results support the finding from the previous regression that the impact of the 
proportionality measure on differences in admit rates is more pronounced at larger institutions, 
although the alternative explanation that the decline in preference for men at smaller institutions 
is due to the combining of athletes and non-athletes in the data can not be ruled out.    
 An institution's Title IX exposure as measured by the proportionality standard appears to 
play a significant role in explaining the relative admit rate of men versus women conditional on 
the mix of applicants and their relative academic qualifications at least as captured by average 
sent SAT scores.  A relatively large, selective institution that receives many more applications 
from women than men, based on the results found here, is going to have a lower admit rate for 
women than men.  Furthermore, that institution is more likely to have a lower proportionality 
measure than an institution that receives approximately equal numbers of applications from men 
and women, and thus is more likely to provide additional preference for men in admissions.  A 
male student hoping for admittance into a selective university would do well to apply to a large, 
private university with a disproportionate number of female applicants relative to male 
applicants, with a low proportionality measure.     
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VII. Conclusion 
 A number of studies have examined the growing trend of more female students enrolling 
in college than male students.  Another set of studies have analyzed the institutional factors 
associated with Title IX compliance via the proportionality standard.  This study has linked these 
two areas and investigated the relationship between Title IX compliance and the difference in 
admit rates of men relative to women.  The results presented here support the hypothesis that 
Title IX and the proportionality standard of compliance has had the unintended consequence of 
resulting in higher admit rates for men relative to women than would otherwise be the case.  That 
is, institutions with lower proportionality measures, indicating potential non-compliance with 
Title IX, are subsequently more likely to admit men relative to women than an institution with a 
comparable mix of applicants which is compliant with the proportionality measure.   
 This leads to the question of whether Title IX is really providing enhanced opportunities 
for women.  Clearly, since the inception of Title IX in 1972, athletic opportunities for women in 
high school and college have increased substantially.  The results of this analysis provide 
evidence that these athletic opportunities may be coming at the cost of fewer academic 
opportunities for women at some institutions than would have otherwise been the case.  If so, 
Title IX may be more about creating opportunities for certain groups of women (and men), while 
limiting opportunities for other groups of women (and men).     
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Table 1      
Sample Construction      
      
      
  No. of   No. of   
  Institutions Observations 
Total Sample  1,325  3,979  
     No. Institutions=1339      
      
Less:      
Admit Rate > .67  (902)  (2911)  
      
Missing SAT by gender  (4)  (13)  
      
Less than 30 scores for each gender (28)  (48)  
      
No. of undergraduates less than 10,000 (311)  (787)  
      
Missing Proportionality 
Measure  (4)  (8)  
      
              Final Sample  76   212  
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Table 2        
Summary Measures        
        
Institution-Year  (n=212)        
Admit Rate for: Mean  
St. 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum
     Men 0.5  0.134  0.221  0.895 
     Women 0.527  0.139  0.2  0.83 
        
Ave. Sent SAT - Math Score        
     Men 564.4  47.4  435  673 
     Women 529.5  45.1  409  631 
        
Ave. Sent SAT - Verbal Score        
     Men 526.6  40.9  401  623 
     Women 520.7  41.2  412  613 
        
Number of Applications        
     Men 9,410  4,233  1,638  19,519 
     Women 11,081  5,035  2,035  23,924 
        
Institutional Averages (n=76)        
        
Proportionality Measure -7.4  5.5  -26.6  2.6 
        
No. of FTE Undergraduates 18,734  6,662  10,016  36,164 
        
Public Control 0.86  0.35  0  1 
        
Research/Doctoral University 0.84  0.37  0  1 
        
Masters University 0.16  0.37  0  1 
        
Athletic Program Revenue 16,620  1,549  0  56,112 
(in thousands $)        
        
Football Team 0.72  0.27  0  1 
        
No. of Men's Teams 10.2  2.7  5  18 
        
No. of Women's Teams 9.9  2.6  4  17 
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 Table 3          
Regression Results          
      8k plus  12k plus  
  Spec (1)  Spec (2)  Spec (3)  Spec (4)  
          
Constant  -0.038  -0.034  -0.058 *** -0.038  
  (0.028)  (0.027)  (.022)  (.038)  
          
Ave. SAT Math Score  0.0004  0.0002  0.001  0.0003  
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
          
Ave. SAT Verbal Score  0.0012  0.0011  0.0003  0.0013  
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
          
Ave. No. of Applicants  -0.0051    -0.0074 * -0.0095 * 
  (0.0037)    (.0038)  (.0054)  
           
Ave. No. of Applicants Squared -0.0018 **   -0.0019 ** -0.0027 **
  (0.0009)    (0.0009)  (0.0012)  
          
          
No. of Observations  212  212  275  180  
          
LM test  28.98  30.35  39.73  23.68  
(p-value)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
          
Hausman Test  2.38  1.88  6.35  1.55  
(p-value)  (0.666)  (0.39)  (0.17)  (0.82)  
          
          
Average Fixed Effects  -0.0237  -0.0525  -0.068  -0.01  
(wghted by total no. of applications)         
  76  76  98  62  
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Table 4         
Two-stage least squares         
     2nd-stage  
 OLS  1st-stage  spec (1)  spec (2)  
Constant .014  -9.35 * -0.045  0.061  
 (0.03)  (5.03)  (0.039)  (0.050)  
Proportionality Measure -0.006 ** -----  -0.017 *** 0.014 ** 
 (0.002)    (0.005)  (0.007)  
Proportionality Measure squared -0.0002 * -----  -0.0006 *** ----  
 (0.0001)    (0.0002)     
Proportionality*No. FTE Undergrad -----  -----    -0.0013 *** 
(000s)       (0.0005)  
Overall Admit Rate -0.038  7.17  -0.028  -0.019  
 (0.043)  (6.18)  (0.048)  (0.056)  
Public Control -0.041 ** -4.89 *** -0.050 *** -0.047 ** 
 (0.016)  (1.67)  (0.019)  (0.022)  
No. of FTE Undergraduates (000) -0.0003  0.278 *** 0.0003  -0.0056 ** 
 (0.0009)  (0.124)  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  
Athletic Revenue   0.232      
   (.197)      
Athletic Revenue Squared   -0.0045      
   (0.0034)      
No. of Men's Teams   -0.502      
   (0.420)      
No. of Women's Teams   0.125      
   (0.442)      
No. of Male Applicants (000)   2.09 ***     
   (0.450)      
No. of Female Applicants (000)   -1.56 ***     
   (0.353)      
Football Team   -2.457      
   (2.021)      
Division III   -1.849      
   (2.620)      
Division II   0.615      
   (2.321)      
Division IA   -2.137      
   (2.37)      
Master's University   0.435      
   (1.958)      
No. of observations 76  76  76    
Notes:   
Weighted by the total number of applications.        
*** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.       
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Table 5         
Two-stage least squares by institution size        
 Smaller Institutions (8K-plus)  Larger Institutions (12k plus)  
 1st-stage  2nd-stage  1st-stage  2nd-stage  
Constant -11.202 *** -0.040  -13.265 ** -0.064  
 (4.25)  (0.055)  (5.922)  (0.050)  
Proportionality Measure -----  -0.00001   -----  -0.022 *** 
   (0.009)    (0.009)  
Proportionality Measure squared -----  -0.0001   -----  -0.0007 * 
   (0.0003)    (0.0004)  
Overall Admit Rate 12.26 ** 0.048  12.32 * -0.008  
 (4.99)  (0.053)  (6.53)  (0.059)  
Public Control -3.33 ** -0.053 *** -4.91 ** -0.053 ** 
 (1.43)  (0.017)  (2.11)  (0.024)  
Athletic Revenue 0.149    0.109    
 (.179)    (.225)    
Athletic Revenue Squared -0.0021    -0.0014    
 (0.0030)    (0.0037)    
No. of Men's Teams -0.578    -0.247    
 (0.359)    (0.492)    
No. of Women's Teams 0.256    0.110    
 (0.370)    (0.495)    
No. of Male Applicants (000) 2.11 ***   1.87 ***   
 (0.390)    (0.517)    
No. of Female Applicants (000) -1.37 ***   -1.13 ***   
 (0.308)    (0.415)    
Football Team -3.475 **   -1.618    
 (1.682)    (2.509)    
Division III -2.548    -2.771    
 (2.096)    (3.717)    
Division II 0.024    -0.630    
 (1.995)    (2.720)    
Division IA -0.084    -0.057    
 (2.04)    (2.611)    
Master's University 1.88    3.527    
 (1.616)    (2.260)    
No. of observations 98  98  62  62  
Notes:         
Weighted by the total number of applications.        
*** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.      
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 Appendix A      
Table 1A      
Regression Results      
Dependent Variable = natural log (male admit rate/female admit rate)  
      
  Admit Rate    
  Differential    
      
Constant  -0.122 **   
  (0.048)    
      
Ln (Ave. SAT Math Score Ratio) 1.174    
  (0.838)    
      
Ln(Ave. SAT Verbal Score Ratio) 0.297    
  (0.771)    
      
Ln (Ave. No. of Applicants Ratio) -0.023    
  (0.035)    
       
      
No. of Observations  212     
      
LM test  36.98    
(p-value)  (0.001)    
      
Hausman Test  2.04    
(p-value)  (0.564)    
      
Average Fixed Effects  -0.055    
(wghted by total no. of applications)     
  76    
      
Notes      
*** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.   
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Appendix A      
Table 2A      
Two-Stage Least Squares     
Second-stage dependent variable is natural log of admit rate ratios by sex 
First-stage dependent variable is proportionality measure  
  1st-stage  2nd-stage  
Constant  -9.35 * -0.168 ** 
  (5.03)  (0.071)  
Proportionality Measure -----  -0.027 *** 
    (0.009)  
Proportionality Measure squared -----  -0.0008 * 
    (0.0004)  
Overall Admit Rate  7.17 0.094
  (6.18) (0.086)
Public Control  -4.89 *** -0.086 ** 
  (1.67)  (0.034)  
No. of FTE Undergraduates (000) 0.278 *** 0.00004  
  (0.124)  (0.0019)  
Athletic Revenue  0.232    
  (.197)    
Athletic Revenue Squared -0.0045    
  (0.0034)    
No. of Men's Teams  -0.502    
  (0.420)    
No. of Women's Teams 0.125    
  (0.442)    
No. of Male Applicants (000) 2.09 ***   
  (0.450)    
No. of Female Applicants (000) -1.56 ***   
  (0.353)    
Football Team  -2.457    
  (2.021)    
Division III  -1.849    
  (2.620)    
Division II  0.615    
  (2.321)    
Division IA  -2.137    
  (2.37)    
Master's University  0.435    
  (1.958)    
No. of observations  76  76  
Notes:      
Weighted by the total number of applications.   
*** (**, *) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level.  
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